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ARTICLES
STAYING PUBLIC: INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 1
Alan R. Palmiter*
Abstract
This essay questions the ascendance of U.S. private capital markets.
Data on capital formation over the past decade (before the Panic of 2008)
cast doubt on the story of capital users increasing their relative reliance
on private capital. Further, the investment rules (and cultures) under
which institutional investors operate suggest that private capital has only
a limited pool from which to draw. Institutional investors, which
collectively hold more than three-fourths of U.S. capital market
investments, have not moved significantly from public trading markets to
private trading markets. Rather than “going private,” they have “stayed
public.”
This study assembles data (apparently for the first time) on the
investment practices of the major categories of institutional investors in
the United States. It finds that institutional allocation between public and
private capital has been relatively stable over the past decade. While the
proportion of private investments has risen slightly for some U.S.
institutional investors (private and public pension plans, endowment
funds), it has fallen slightly for others (mutual funds, insurance
companies). Institutional reticence toward private capital derives from the
various investment restrictions on institutional investors and an
institutional culture that focuses on “comparative”, not “absolute”
returns.

Much has been made lately of U.S. companies going private—
ownership of their equity (and sometimes debt) passing from public to
private capital markets. In both the popular financial press and the academic
literature, the focus has been on the cost-benefit analysis for companies that
shun the regulated public securities in favor of the less regulated private
securities markets. 2 Specifically, the debate has turned mostly on whether
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. I thank Allen Mauldin (JD ‘10) for his
invaluable help on this essay. He researched the portfolio allocation rules and practices of
institutional investors in the United States, a task made more interesting and challenging by the
almost complete absence of any law review or business articles on the topic. In fact, this would
seem to be ground-breaking work—at least in the academy—and Allen was the one who first
tilled the soil.
1. This essay was originally prepared for the Journal’s symposium, The “Going Private” of
U.S. Capital Markets.
2. See David Wessel, Closing the Door: Going Private Offers Rewards, WALL ST. J., May
17, 2007, at A2; Robert Bartlett, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of
Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088830.
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the going-private phenomenon, viewed by many as inexorable, is driven by
companies seeking to avoid public market costs (particularly the regulation
introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) or to find private market
benefits.
Missing from the debate, focused as it is on the demand side of the U.S.
capital markets, has been attention to the supply side. The prevailing
assumption has been that capital suppliers will adjust the mix of public and
private capital as needed to meet the demand of capital users. That is,
capital will flow to its most efficient use and will move from public to
private markets (and from retail regulation to wholesale regulation) to meet
the regulatory and other calculus of companies seeking capital. Only
individual retail investors, a dwindling class in the throes of
“deretailization,” will be stuck in the public markets.
But the assumption that institutional investors—which constitute more
than three-fourths of both the U.S. public equity markets and U.S. public
debt markets 3—can move their portfolios from publicly-traded securities to
privately-traded securities is largely untested. The various institutional
investors in the United States, each subject to their own panoply of
regulatory restrictions and financial cultures, face a number of constraints in
shifting from the public to the private capital markets. Indeed, institutional
capital may be locked into the public markets far more than the goingprivate debate recognizes.
In this essay, I question the story that the going-private phenomenon
threatens to unravel retail markets and thus retail regulation. The data, even
on casual observation, suggests otherwise. With the institutionalization of
the U.S. capital markets, all indications over the past couple decades are
that the U.S. public capital markets retain their dominance: stock listings
and capital formation in public markets remain robust, the proportion of
public market financing remains constant (if not slightly higher than private
market financing), and retail investors still constitute a sizeable proportion
of the U.S. equity markets.
The staying power of public capital markets is not surprising given their
(oft-repeated) advantages and attendant regulation. Public securities
markets in the United States are open to all—including to individual retail
investors, all stripes of institutional investors, and even foreign investors
(private and governmental). All benefit from public market liquidity,
transparency, and accountability—each a public good not fully available in
private markets. Companies that engage in regulatory arbitrage by moving
to private markets for their financing needs must overcome these public
market advantages.

3. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 89, 90,
Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20080918/.
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Beyond the financial advantages of public market investment, many
institutional investors are “captive” to public securities markets. For some,
the regulatory regime under which they operate compels that they
concentrate their portfolios in publicly-traded securities. For example,
registered mutual funds must price their portfolio securities on a daily basis;
they may not hold more than 10% of any one company’s equity securities;
and open-end funds must be prepared to redeem their shares on demand. 4
These regulatory requirements effectively compel mutual funds to hold
diversified portfolios of publicly-traded securities—which they do.
For other institutional investors, an investment culture (as opposed to a
set of regulatory mandates) has come to presuppose public market
investments. For example, private pension funds, subject to a prudent
investor standard under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), continue to place the bulk of their investments in public securities
markets. Given the absence of mandated disclosure, price transparency and
ready liquidity in private markets, managers of private pension funds find it
easier to follow the crowd. Even if diversification into private markets may
offer better long-term returns, the strategy of “blazing new investment
trails” would raise questions about the manager’s prudence.
For some institutional investors, a combination of portfolio allocation
rules and a conservative investment culture leads to portfolios that are
dominated by public market investments. For example, public pension
funds and insurance companies—both subject primarily to state portfolio
regulation—are often compelled to have certain percentages of their
portfolios (both equity and debt) in publicly-traded securities and to limit
their investment in illiquid private investments. In addition, both answer to
oversight bodies for which peer comparability (relative returns) may be
more important than investment maximization (absolute returns).
Not surprisingly, those institutional investors that are least regulated
(foreign sovereign wealth funds) and those that are more willing to embrace
investment experimentation (endowment funds) have shown a willingness
to increase their allocation to private securities markets. But even then, the
investment levels reflect not an exodus, but rather a shift in emphasis. Even
for institutional investors with the legal and cultural flexibility to leave
public markets, the allure of the protections inherent in public market
investment has been notable. Private markets may have carved a niche, but
have not created a movement.
Note on timeframe of data: Most of the data used in this essay come
from before 2008, thus missing the wrenching changes in financial markets
wrought by the Panic of 2008. But the basic conclusions that I reach—
namely, that over the past several years public capital markets have
4. 26 U.S.C. § 851 (2009).
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maintained their comparative advantage over private capital markets and
that institutional investors are committed by law and custom to public
capital markets—are only reinforced by the recent capital market turmoil.
In fact, my main thesis that U.S. institutional capital shows a marked
preference for public capital markets seems to have been tested (and
proved) by the Panic of 2008.
During the current Panic, many investors (individual and institutional)
have sought to abandon the private capital markets. Among the reasons has
been the lack of transparency and liquidity, along with the perception that
private capital markets have done no better, and perhaps worse, than the
public capital markets in anticipating the effects of non-performing
subprime mortgage investments on the U.S. and global financial systems.
The Madoff scandal 5 has only reinforced the growing realization that
private investments may be (sorely) under-regulated, their benefits
outweighed by their costs. In the end, this essay confirms an emerging
consensus that the public capital markets offer advantages that the private
capital markets cannot duplicate. The old-fashioned investment allocation
rules under which many institutional investors have long operated may
reflect a time-worn wisdom.
***
I begin this essay in Part I with a look at the “going private”
phenomenon, summarizing the extent of and the reasons for U.S. companies
turning to the private capital markets—that is, the demand side of the
market. Next, Part II turns to an overview of the U.S. capital markets,
considering the ongoing deretailization of the public equity markets, the
flows of new capital into the U.S. public equity markets, and the trends in
the allocation between public and private financing. Finally, Part III looks
at the supply side of the institutional capital markets in the United States,
considering the portfolio allocation rules and practices (and investment
cultures) of the various institutional investor categories—with a particular
focus on the public/private investment mix for each.
I. “GOING PRIVATE”—THE DEMAND SIDE
Before exploring the staying power of the U.S. public securities
markets—both generally and for institutional investors—it is useful to
consider the siren call of the “going-private” phenomenon. For those who
have looked at the phenomenon, mostly in only the last couple years, views
differ on its scope and future. Although there is data pointing to a surge in
companies turning (wholly or partially) to private capital markets, the
5. See Tom Lauricella, Aaron Lucchetti & Amir Efrati, Madoff Ran Vast Options Game,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, at A1; see also Brett Arends, Madoff An Unwitting Poster Boy for
Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122946065748411579.html (describing how the Madoff scandal has reinforced superiority and
safety of public mutual funds for investors).
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phenomenon showed signs as early as 2006 of having reached an apex. 6
That is, even as some have argued that conditions in the public capital
markets (particularly the compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley) have led many
U.S. companies to engage in regulatory arbitrage by shifting to private
capital markets, the more considered evidence is that private capital
constitutes an important niche, but does not constitute a tidal shift in U.S.
corporate capitalism. 7
“Going private” has come in three flavors: (1) public companies that
remove their publicly-traded securities from the public markets and thus
avoid further public company reporting and regulation; (2) public
companies that satisfy new capital needs on private markets, but remain
subject to public company reporting (and sometimes regulation); and (3)
private companies that remain private, relying on private financing for their
capital needs. 8
Over the past ten years, both private equity (funding of operating
companies with non-public equity) and venture capital (funding of start-up
companies with non-public equity) have been extremely volatile as funding
sources. Between 1998 and 2005, the compound growth rate for private
equity investment in North America was only 2.6%, peaking in 2000 at
$128 billion and reaching its lowest point in 2002 at $42.5 billion. 9
Similarly, venture capital investment has swung from a high in 2000 of over
$100 billion, to a modest upward trend from about $20 billion in 2003 to
$30 billion in 2007—an annual growth rate of about 6.9%. 10
6. See Emily Thornton, Going Private, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_09/b3973001.htm.
7. See generally Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity (ECGI, Law
Working Paper Series No. 82, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114.
8. A public company can avoid Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration and
reporting requirements in a couple ways. First, it can de-register (known as “going dark”) when
the number of record shareholders falls below 300 (or sometimes 500)—typically accomplished
through a stock split or stock buyback/tender offer. A public company that “goes dark” does not
change its ownership structure, but exposes itself to shareholder fiduciary claims for the illiquidity
and non-transparency resulting from de-registration. Second, and far more common, the public
company can “go private” by replacing public investors with private investors—accomplished
typically through a squeeze-out merger or buyback/tender offer followed by a back-end merger. A
public company that “goes private” must structure the transaction to be fair to existing
shareholders and then must answer to a new group of outside investors, often including debt
investors. See Michael J. McGuinness & Timo Rehbock, Going-Private Transactions: A
Practitioner’s Guide, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437 (2005) (discussing legal standards applicable to a
going-private transaction, including the business judgment rule, fairness doctrine and judicial
review); see generally FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP, DISCUSSION AT THE NATIONAL DIRECTORS
INSTITUTE: GOING PRIVATE / GOING DARK TRANSACTIONS, Mar. 10, 2005, available at
www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/2691/NDI_ GoingPrivate_FINAL.pdf.
9. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PRIVATE EQUITY GOING PUBLIC: GLOBAL PRIVATE
EQUITY REPORT 2006, at 12 (2007), available at https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/
moneytree/filesource/exhibits/Global_PE_ 2006.pdf [hereinafter PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS].
10. A 2008 PricewaterhouseCoopers report shows new investment in venture capital firms (in
billions of dollars) for the past ten years:
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Although private equity and venture capital dominated business
conversations during the early 2000s, industry observers noted the “glass
ceiling” both seemed to face. A 2007 report on private equity by
PricewaterhouseCoopers began by pointing out the growing trend of private
equity firms seeking access to public market equity. 11
A. REASONS FOR COMPANIES TO GO PRIVATE
The prevailing justifications for companies to go private are to avoid
the heavy compliance costs of being public (particularly after SarbanesOxley) and to avoid the myopic and shifting expectations of public
markets. 12 Once private, companies can raise capital less expensively,
without the regulatory burden and competitive side effects of public
disclosure, and can focus their business plans on the long-term, without the
short-term financial demands of the financial media and public investors. 13
The protections for investors in public companies are replicated for
investors in private companies through ex ante contractual disclosure and
participation rights, as well as the ex post antifraud rules of the federal
securities laws.
Compliance costs (that private firms avoid) arise from the retail
regulation that applies to raising capital (mostly under the Securities Act of
1933) and to ongoing status as a public company (mostly under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002). For a typical $100 million initial public offering, out-of-pocket
expenses run at about $3 million, and the usual underwriting spread (7%)
reduces the offering proceeds by another $7 million. 14 Add to this the
present value of ongoing disclosure requirements, as well as the auditing
and internal control costs borne by public companies, less the reduced costs
of subsequent offerings, and going public becomes quite costly. 15

1998
21.1

1999
54.1

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (Q1/Q2)
105.0 40.6
22.0
19.8
22.4
23.1
26.7
30.7
14.9
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS AND NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, MONEYTREE
REPORT: TOTAL U.S. INVESTMENTS BY YEAR Q1 1998 – Q2 2008 (2008), available at
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/moneytree/filesource/exhibits/MoneyTree%20%20Q2%202008%20final.pdf (showing total investments in venture-backed companies).
11. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 9, at 5 (asserting that the potential desire to
access public markets by private equity is a driver of the trend to better conform with the norms of
public markets).
12. See Thornton, supra note 6 (discussing that companies chose to go public to avoid both the
costs of regulation and gain the ability to concentrate on the long term repairing of the company).
13. See id.
14. See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 1 COL. BUS. L. REV. 172 (2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012042.
15. See id.
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Private equity, it has been claimed, reaped large rewards in recent
years. 16 Ronald Masulis and Randall Thomas identify a major reason for
this success to be the corporate governance advantages of private equity
over the public corporation. 17 They argue that the recent development of
substantial derivative contracts and trading has significantly weakened the
governance of public corporations, compelling a need for much closer
supervision of management by financially sophisticated directors. 18 The
private equity model delivers these benefits and allows corporations to be
better governed, creating wealth gains for investors. 19
Dale Oesterle identifies the ability of companies financed by private
equity to engage in longer-term, higher-risk, positive net value business
strategies and to create financial incentives for managers without being
subject to public disclosure and short-term market demands. 20 Private
companies (often financed primarily through debt rather than equity) have a
different management style, compared to public companies. 21 Their boards
are smaller and more knowledgeable, with uniform goals and more
monitoring functions. 22 Managers (who need not answer to public
shareholders, analysts or the media) have more freedom to take risks,
particularly given the board’s emphasis on long-term results. 23 Management
compensation is more performance-based, with less protection from
failure. 24
In addition, there are indications that companies that rely on private
markets no longer suffer the heavy liquidity and non-transparency discounts
that once characterized private markets. For example, some private markets,
open to a wide array of institutional investors and wealthy individuals, have
come to resemble public markets. In 2007, Goldman Sachs created an
institutions-only trading market, GSTrue, which served as the platform for
16. Whether private equity has produced better risk-adjusted returns than public equity has
produced a lively debate. Cf. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity
Create Wealth? (Vanderbilt Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 08-20, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1207858; William W. Bratton, Private
Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2008).
17. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts a Form of Governance Arbitrage?, 3
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53 (2008). Not surprisingly, going-private transactions in the
United States are more prevalent among established, solid-growth, low-leveraged public
companies—a phenomenon also observed in the UK and Ireland. See Hadiye Aslan & Praveen
Kumar, Going Public and Going Private: What Determines the Choice of Ownership Structure?,
(June 12, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993170 (finding that “firms going private
through private equity buyouts are larger, less levered, and have superior cash flows than firms
that go private through other types of transactions.”).
21. Oesterle, supra note 20 at 53, 63–64.
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id. at 64.
24. Id.
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an $828 million IPO. 25 In cooperation with a number of securities firms,
NASDAQ also has developed PORTAL, an institutions-only market for
144A debt. 26
A good deal of debate has swirled around the question of whether
compliance costs under Sarbanes-Oxley have catalyzed the going-private
movement in the United States. 27 Although the initial (mostly politicallymotivated) reactions were that Sarbanes-Oxley was driving companies from
U.S. public markets, recent academic studies cast significant doubts on the
story. Instead, the data suggest that larger public companies have actually
benefited from the legislation—the various auditing and internal controls
provide reassurance to investors. 28 For smaller companies, however,
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs may have been a factor in their goingprivate decisions. In the end, however, the worldwide private equity boom
(including in countries where Sarbanes-Oxley does not apply) suggests that
compliance costs have not been the dominant factor influencing the U.S.
going-private phenomenon. 29
Evidence of the relative unimportance of Sarbanes-Oxley to the goingprivate decision, particularly for larger companies, comes from a number of
quarters. Robert Bartlett, looking at 468 going-private transactions from
1998–2006 (excluding 2002), found that larger public companies going
private after the 2002 legislation continued to use high-yield public debt to
finance their transactions, thus remaining subject to public registration and
reporting requirements. 30 That is, even as private capital became more
available, many companies opted to continue their public reporting status.
Likewise, many practitioners have commented that Sarbanes-Oxley played
a minor role in large-company going-private transactions; many companies

25. Apollo Raises $828 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2007, at C6.
26. See Lynn Cowan, Banks to Share Platform for 144A Trades, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2007,

at C3.
27. See Marc Morgenstern & Peter Nealis, Going Private: A Reasoned Response to SarbanesOxley? (2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/pnealis.pdf (asserting the
diminishing benefits of remaining public and the rewards of going private, and concluding that
costs of going private or going dark keep many public companies from realizing the rewards of
going private).
28. See Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion
of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions (May 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=990016 (citing to a “growing body of evidence that SOX has increased
the scrutiny on firms and has produced certain benefits.”).
29. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis 56–57 (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Law and
Econ.
Working
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
52,
2006),
available
at
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art52/.
30. Bartlett, supra note 2. In fact, Bartlett found that the rates of public registration actually
increased for larger companies in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period. In purchasing notes, a bidder is
often required by the lender to subject itself to Sarbanes-Oxley-like regulation. Issuers of highyield notes are generally required to file periodic reports with the SEC as a result of an express
obligation in an agreement.
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turned to private equity as a means to restructure rather than avoid
regulation. 31
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley may have
been a factor (though not the only factor) in pushing smaller companies out
of public markets. Bill Carney has cited an increase in the number of
companies going private after Sarbanes-Oxley, though he acknowledges
that many of these going-private transactions may have been the result of
declining stock prices. 32 That is, Sarbanes-Oxley may have simply
identified those companies for which the net benefits of public status
hovered near zero. And for those smaller companies that have not exited the
public markets, the calculus may well have been that the benefits that led
the companies to initially go public outweigh the compliance and other
costs of Sarbanes-Oxley. 33
B. EFFECT OF COMPANIES GOING PRIVATE
The going-private phenomenon, i.e., the movement of companies from
public capital to private capital, has had the effect of carving out an
investment niche available only to non-retail investors. It is widely
assumed that the expansion of private markets has added to the growing
institutionalization of the U.S. securities markets—and thus their
concomitant “deretailization.” 34 For example, Brian Cartwright (the SEC’s
general counsel) has pointed to the general exclusion of retail investors
from venture capital, private equity and hedge funds—which Cartwright
has assumed provide higher diversified returns than other asset classes
available to retail investors. 35
In the end, it remains to be seen whether private capital provided by
wealthy individuals and institutional investors protected only by private
systems of disclosure and oversight can be as effective as their public
counterparts. The early evidence is mixed. Although there has been a
31. Symposium, Corporate Governance: The Ins and Outs for Ds and Os: Sarbanes-Oxley:
Was It Worth It?, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. 643, 664 (2007).
32. William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of ‘Going
Private’, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 151, 158 (2006). There is general agreement that Sarbanes-Oxley’s
compliance burdens fell more heavily on smaller public companies. See Joseph A. Castelluccio
III, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 404 and the Case for a Small Business
Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 429 (2005) (proposing a small-company exemption to section 404
of Sarbanes-Oxley).
33. See Andrew Skouvakis, Comment, Exiting the Public Markets: A Difficult Choice for
Small Public Companies Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1279, 1291
(2005) (pointing out that Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs decline over time, with
implementation costs disappearing once required internal control systems are in place).
34. See Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics: The Future of Securities
Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch102407bgc.htm) (coining the phrase “deretailization” to describe the decreasing proportion
of, and investment opportunities for, individual retail investors in the public equities markets).
35. Id.
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widespread view that private equity outperforms public equity—given the
lower compliance costs and higher net value business models for private
companies—more recent evidence suggests that private equity may not be
scaleable. 36
There are reasons to doubt the broad future of private equity. Private
companies suffer from two levels of opacity. First, private companies are
subject to more limited observation. Rather than the many observers in a
public company (shareholders, independent directors, regulators, media),
private companies, for the most part, have only their capital providers (and
perhaps independent directors) to watch over them. Second, the opacity
within private companies is compounded by the opacity within institutional
investors themselves. Without intermediating public markets, institutional
investors may not be optimal owners. Many cannot sit on the board of
portfolio companies, most do not disclose their voting, none have
enforceable fiduciary duties as shareholders, and there exists no
institutional ethos of oversight.
C. GOING-PRIVATE PHENOMENON IN CONTEXT
The going-private phenomenon of the past decade should be kept in
context. It is not the first time that U.S. capital users have turned to private
capital—only to return to public capital after a short dalliance. The depth
and liquidity of the public capital markets, despite their regulatory costs and
homogenizing tendencies, have proven more attractive and permanent. In
short, public capital may well be the worst form of capitalism, except for all
the others.
Escape from public markets is a regular and cyclical phenomenon. In
the 1940s, corporate America turned to the government and its cost-plus
contracts for capital during the war effort. In the 1960s, many companies
shunned the public capital markets and opted for private capital from
conglomerate structures. In the 1980s, many companies (whether or not
subject to a takeover bid) turned to private debt markets to buy out public
equity owners and finance their streamlined businesses.
That is, movements away from public capital have not had staying
power—eventually they fall victim to their lack of depth and effective
oversight. 37 For example, Brian Cheffins and John Armour have concluded
that private equity, despite its current momentum, is unlikely to ever
displace the public stock market as the center of U.S. financial markets. 38
36. See Wessel, supra note 2, at A2 (identifying as reasons for public companies to go private
the avoidance of public securities regulation, the leveraging of the company to maximize equity
returns, the ability to make tough restructuring decisions, and the attraction of better executives).
37. See id. (concluding that private equity is not permanent, citing the leveraged-buyout (LBO)
boom of the 1980s that ended when targets became more expensive and credit became tighter).
38. Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity 4 (ECGI, Law Working
Paper Series No. 82, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114.
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They emphasize the results of prior merger trends, including the dominance
of conglomerates in the 1960s and the rise in leveraged buyouts of the
1980s, noting that both eras ended with a return by investors to public
markets. 39 The authors predict that, given the trend beginning in 2006 of
private equity firms turning to IPOs, public markets will play a significant
role in the future of private equity. 40
There are already signs that the recent going-private movement may be
waning, with the private-public pendulum swinging back to public capital.41
Steven Davidoff, finding evidence of this in recent litigation trends, notes
that, during the bear market that began in 2007, private equity firms
repeatedly sought to terminate pending acquisitions. 42 The litigation
surrounding these terminations, Davidoff concludes, has exposed the failure
of parties to specify fully their investment relationship and raises doubts
about the optimality of private equity. 43
Not only do these terminations suggest that private contracting may be
less fulsome than the gap-filling provided by public corporate law, they also
undermine the story that private equity has a longer-term investment
horizon and greater valuation perspicacity than public equity. Instead,
public equity, with its long-standing legal and market structures, as well as
its transparency and mechanisms for self-correction, may be a more optimal
investment method.
So is this latest dalliance with private capital different? Ultimately, the
answer depends on a combination of factors, such as whether private capital
is indeed less expensive and whether the business structures it facilitates are
more efficient than public capital. But even more important is whether
private capital is as deep as public capital—a question that depends on
whether U.S. capital (now mostly institutional) has the capability to switch
from public markets to private markets.
II. U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS—INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
CAPITAL FLOWS
U.S. capital markets have not been static. Over the past half century,
ownership of public equity has shifted dramatically from individuals to
institutions—perhaps reflecting (at least in part) the greater monitoring and
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Predictions that this time the private equity phenomenon was here to stay may have been

premature. See Thornton, supra note 6 (describing high-profile going-private transactions and
private equity markets; concluding that companies financed by private equity will not revert to
public companies).
42. Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148178 (identifying as a
“flaw” that lawyers negotiating and drafting private equity contracts failed to appreciate the extralegal norms surrounding private equity financing).
43. Id.
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governance efficacy of institutional shareholders, compared to their more
dispersed and less effective individual counterparts. 44
The mass migration from individual ownership to institutional
ownership, however, has not been matched by a movement to private
markets—where institutions presumably face fewer impediments (legal and
financial) to invest. 45 Instead, public markets continue to garner the bulk of
both equity and debt financing. Although twenty years ago some predicted
an “eclipse of the public corporation,” the private financing of once-public
corporations bought out in leveraged buyouts was short-lived. 46
The following charts capture the principal stories of capital movements
in the United States over the past few decades. They tell a story, in its
essence, that U.S. public capital markets have come to be dominated by
institutional investors. They further tell the story that this
institutionalization has not led to dramatic shifts away from public equity
markets, despite the shifting concentrations in institutional ownership.
A. DERETAILIZATION OF EQUITY MARKETS
Since 1945, the proportion of retail ownership of publicly-traded
equities has declined steadily. In 1950, households owned more than 90%
of publicly-traded U.S. equities; at the close of 2007, household ownership
stood at just over 25%. 47

44. See Cartwright, supra note 34.
45. See Morgenstern & Nealis, supra note 27.
46. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept–Oct. 1989

(Revised 1997), at 1–4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149.
47. SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION [SIFMA], 2008 FACT
BOOK, 71 (electronic version) (citing FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3) [hereinafter 2008
FACT BOOK].
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Figure 1 48

Moreover, while retail ownership of public equity (in dollar terms and
as a proportion of GDP) declined markedly after the 2000s dot.com
collapse, it stabilized over the ensuing years. 49 In fact, retail ownership of
public equity as a proportion of GDP (except for the dot.com bubble) has
been relatively stable over the past three decades. 50

48. Id. Data for 2002–2007 is taken directly from FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3.
49. Id. at 71; see also Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic Product,

http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&FirstYear=2007&LastYe
ar=2008&Freq=Qtr (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (listing total value of U.S. gross domestic product
by year).
50. 2008 FACT BOOK, supra note 47, at 71 (citing FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at
90); Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, supra note 49.

258

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

Figure 2 51

B. CAPITAL FLOWS
The data also reveals a (short term) return to stability in the public
equity markets after the dot.com bubble, precisely during the period of the
supposed ascendance of private equity. For example, the story of a
withering public equity market during the early 2000s is not borne out by
the number of listed companies on public stock exchanges. Although the
number of public listings declined after the dot.com era, it stabilized
afterward. As of 2007 there were about 7000 listed companies on the U.S.
stock exchanges, about as many as there were prior to the 1994–2002
dot.com bubble. 52

51. Id.
52. See Figure 3, infra note 53.

2009] Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets

259

Figure 3 53

Even more telling was the solid and steady increase in the value of
underwritings in public markets during the period from 2002 to 2007—
including both debt and equity. After a slowdown in the early 2000s, the
public capital markets flourished in the next four years. In absolute terms,
public underwritings increased from approximately $1.2 trillion per year in
the late 1990s to over $3 trillion per year in 2007.

53. 2008 FACT BOOK, supra note 47, at 48 (electronic version) (citing FEDERAL RESERVE
BOARD, supra note 3).
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Figure 4 54

Most telling of the continuing comparative advantage of U.S. public
capital markets during the 2002–2007 period was the proportion of total
U.S. offerings that were public, as compared to those that were private. In
2006, the most recent year for which there are data, public offerings
represented a higher proportion of total U.S. offerings than they had in any
year since 1985. Although there was a clear move toward private financing
in the late 1980s (during the LBO phenomenon), there was no such
movement toward private placements in the 2000s. To the contrary, public
underwritings increased steadily during the 2000s as a proportion of the
overall U.S. capital markets.

54. Id. at 10.
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Figure 5 55

Stepping away from the anecdotal accounts of the “going private” of
U.S. capital markets, the data suggest that the phenomenon is isolated and
even temporary. The public markets, from all indications, are here to stay.
Why is this?
III. “STAYING PUBLIC”—THE SUPPLY SIDE
For the going-private phenomenon to have legs, private capital users
must be able to tap into private capital suppliers. The remarkable (and
seemingly inexorable) decline of retail investors offers superficial support
for the story (or, at least, possibility) of private capital’s ascendance. As
institutional investors have come to dominate the U.S. capital markets, the
supply of private capital would seem nearly inexhaustible—limited only by
the breadth and depth of private capital demand.
The assumption that U.S. institutional investors have the freedom to
allocate their portfolios between private and public investments, however,
misconceives the specific regulatory and cultural restrictions under which
each institutional category operates. For most institutional capital in the
United States, the current reality is that private investment lives under a
variety of de jure and de facto caps.
A snapshot of the supply side of the U.S. public capital markets as of
2007 provides some context. Institutional investors dominate both the U.S.
publicly-traded equity and debt markets:

55. Id.
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Table 1 56
Proportion of Market Ownership by Institutional Investors
Publicly-traded equities
($21.5 trillion)
Mutual funds
Public pension funds
Private pension funds
Life Insurance companies
Financial Institutions
Endowment funds 58
Foreign Investment
Retail (individuals)

28.9%
10.0%
12.9%
8.0%
1.4%
------13.0%
25.4%

Publicly-traded debt 57
($10.7 trillion)
13.4%
2.4%
2.9%
20.3%
14.8%
------23.3%
15.2%

Figure 6 59

Over the past 25 years, the principal story in the institutional equity
market has been the emergence (and now dominance) of mutual funds. The
other story has been the relative decline of pension funds, as retirement
savings has moved from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans, 60
56. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 89–90.
57. Includes holdings of foreign debt by U.S. residents. See id.
58. The Federal Reserve Board does not list endowments separately in its Flow of Funds

report.
59. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 90.
60. In a defined-benefit plan, retirement benefits are determined by a set formula, rather than
depending on investment returns. A traditional pension plan that defines benefits owed by the
employer to employees upon their retirement is a defined-benefit plan. In a defined-contribution
plan, contributions are paid into an individual account for each member. The contributions are
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which rely extensively on mutual funds. And finally there has been the
remarkable arrival in the U.S. equity markets of foreign investors,
particularly foreign sovereign wealth funds.
The following sections describe the portfolio allocation requirements
and strategies for the various categories of institutional investors in the
United States. It is a broad-stroke picture, often generalized and thus
simplistic, but useful in gauging the potential of the “privatization” of U.S.
capital. By and large, the consistent story—with only a few exceptions—is
that institutional investors are bound to the public capital markets either by
law, by long-standing tradition, or both.
A. MUTUAL FUNDS
As of 2007, U.S. mutual funds managed $13 trillion dollars in assets, 61
with approximately $9 trillion in long-term equity and debt funds. 62 Most
mutual fund assets ($6.6 trillion) were held in equity funds and, of this,
most ($5 trillion) in U.S. public equities. 63 Mutual funds represented the
largest category of institutional investors in the U.S. public equity market,
holding almost 25% of total outstanding publicly-traded equities. 64
Mutual funds have grown steadily over the past 25 years. In 1970, U.S.
mutual funds held a total of $47 billion in assets. 65 By the end of 2007, they
held nearly $12 trillion in assets, most (nearly 93%) in open-end mutual
funds that, by law, are subject to redemption on demand. 66 As retirement
assets transition from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans,
mutual fund growth is likely to continue given their widespread use in IRA
and 401(k) plans. 67
then invested, and investment returns (positive or negative) are credited to the individual’s
account. On retirement, the member’s account provides retirement benefits.
61. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE [ICI], 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, 9, fig.
1.1. (2008), available at http://ici.org/stats/latest/2008_factbook.pdf [hereinafter INVESTMENT
COMPANY FACTBOOK].
62. Id. at 135 (approximately $3 trillion is held in short-term money market funds). There are
8,029 registered mutual funds, of which 4,767 are equity funds, 1,967 bond funds, and 807 money
market funds.
63. See id. at 9, fig. 1.1, Investment Company Assets; see also 2008 FACT BOOK, supra note
47, at 71 (electronic version) (citing FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3). Individual assets
in equity funds were twelve times larger than institutional assets. As of 2007, individuals held
over $6 trillion in equity funds, while institutions had invested less than $500 billion. Institutional
investment in mutual funds was highest in money market funds.
64. Equity mutual funds have increased the proportion of their holdings in common and
preferred stock. In 1994, for example, 87.1% of the average equity fund portfolio was in invested
stocks. In 2007, stock investment in such funds was 94.8%. See INVESTMENT COMPANY
FACTBOOK, supra note 61, at 136.
65. Id. at 110.
66. Id. at 9.
67. See PETER BRADY & SARAH HOLDEN, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, RESEARCH
FUNDAMENTALS, THE U.S. RETIREMENT MARKET, 2007, at 1 (July 2008), available at
http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/fm-v17n3.pdf. Defined-contribution and IRA assets, which now
comprise more than half of the total retirement assets in the United States, are heavily invested in
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1. Portfolio Allocation Rules
Mutual funds are subject to diversification rules under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), as well as the Internal Revenue Code. A
registered mutual fund may not invest more than 5% of its assets in any one
issuer (other than the U.S. government), 68 nor may it hold more than 10%
of the securities of any one issuer. 69
The 1940 Act, however, imposes no explicit portfolio allocation
requirements on mutual funds. 70 Nonetheless, the portfolio valuation
requirements imposed by the 1940 Act and SEC rules implicitly compel
mutual funds (especially open-end funds) to invest primarily in publiclytraded securities. Open-end funds are required to calculate, at least daily,
the net asset value of their holdings, typically after the close of the major
U.S. exchanges. 71 Assets with readily available price information are valued
at current market value, and other assets at “fair value” as determined in
good faith by the fund’s board of directors. 72
These pricing rules have generally led mutual funds to invest only in
publicly-traded liquid securities and to avoid illiquid assets such as venture
capital, private equity, or restricted shares of public companies. 73
Recognizing the difficulties of valuing illiquid securities, 74 the SEC has
recommended that funds limit investment in illiquid assets to no more than
10% to 15% of fund assets. 75 In practice, equity funds invest less than 1%
in non-publicly-traded securities. 76
mutual funds. At the close of 2007, 47% of IRA assets were held in mutual funds, compared to
38% held in securities brokerage accounts. See id. at 5. Similarly, mutual funds manage 54% of
total assets in 401(k) and 403(b) retirement plans. See id. at 10.
68. 26 U.S.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2009).
69. 26 U.S.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii).
70. SEC rules require only that at least 80% of a fund’s assets be invested in a manner
suggested by the fund’s name. 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2008).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2008).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a41-1 (2008) (defining “value” as (i) “market value” for securities for
which market quotations are readily available, and (ii) for all others, “fair value as determined in
good faith by the board of directors”); Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (requiring
“current net asset value” to be computed at least daily, at such time fixed by the fund’s board of
directors); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (2008) (defining “current net asset value” for purposes of
calculating value of redeemable fund shares).
73. Janet Smith, Richard Smith & Karyn Williams, The SEC’s “Fair Value” Standard for
Mutual Fund Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 421 (2001).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 445 (describing Accounting Series Releases 113 and 118); see also TAMAR
FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 353 (3d ed. 2005)
(noting that in 1992, the SEC revised its guidelines to permit open-end funds to invest up to 15%
of assets in illiquid securities).
76. Smith, Smith & Williams, supra note 73, at 446. By paying a premium for liquidity, it has
been argued (without empirical support) that mutual funds do not attain the returns or the
diversification that other investment funds do. Id. at 423–24. Whether mutual funds will invest in
less liquid assets, given the current market slowdown, is unknown. See id. at 435.
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2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice
Although no statute or regulation requires that mutual funds shun
private securities, such has been the practice. Mutual funds (particularly
open-end funds) have not come close to the limits on illiquid assets
suggested by the SEC. 77
Table 2 78

Why has mutual fund investment in illiquid assets been minimal? No
doubt such investments present problems for both parties. Open-end funds,
which must be prepared to redeem their shares, understandably seek to
avoid a “run on the fund,” which would be exacerbated with sticky private
assets. Further, mutual funds holding private assets may face, along with
their investors, “valuation shock” if a financial shock ever forced the
revaluation of private assets. The subprime re-valuations during the Panic
of 2008 present a powerful case in point.
Likewise, private capital is generally (and increasingly) loath to take on
investors unwilling to abide by longer-term investment horizons. In fact, the
typical commitment of two or more years that many private equity firms
and hedge funds demand of their investors is at odds with the liquidity
expectations and the turnover practices of most equity mutual funds, many
of which turn over more than half their portfolios annually. 79 Moreover, the
disclosure rules imposed on mutual funds concerning their portfolio
holdings are at odds with the secrecy sought (and demanded) by private
assets, such as private equity and hedge funds. That is, the public
transparency required of mutual funds may be anathema to the nontransparency of private assets.
Furthermore, mutual funds’ focus on public assets may simply be a
response to customer predilections. Mutual funds are marketed (and their
portfolios structured) with a view to public market indexes and
77. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, supra note 61, at 135.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 28–29 (Figure 2.9) (reporting asset-weighted turnover in stock funds of 51% in

2007). Others have calculated a higher average turnover rate of 91%. See also John C. Bogle,
Mutual
Funds
and
Taxes,
The
Bogle
eBlog
(Apr.
12,
2006),
http://johncbogle.com/wordpress/2006/04/12/mutual-funds-and-taxes/.
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comparisons, virtually ignoring the existence of private market alternatives.
Given that mutual funds are primarily used by individual investors and not
other institutions, 80 it is not surprising that mutual funds would conform to
the liquidity and price transparency demands of their principal customers.
Institutional investors interested in private assets can access them directly.
Almost by definition, retail investors seek the assurances of retail
regulation.
3. Conclusion
Without customers clamoring for private assets in their mutual fund
portfolios, the industry has few incentives to risk adding an asset class that
could result in redemption risks, revaluation/pricing surprises, and
transparency conflicts. The industry, which until the fund timing scandals
of the early 1990s was able to assert a nearly flawless record, has naturally
avoided any risk of embarrassment. With retirement money flowing into the
industry and without an end in sight, there is no reason for mutual funds to
take on private investments and thus to put at risk the industry’s reputation
for never failing to meet a redemption demand at market—at least until the
Panic of 2008. 81
B. PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS
Public pension funds—which invest retirement assets for government
(mostly state) employees—are the next largest U.S. institutional investor,
with approximately 10% of U.S. public equity and 2.4% of U.S. public
debt. 82 Public pension funds—which held, as of 2007, $4.4 trillion in assets
(about three-fourths of the amount held by private pension funds)—have
modestly increased their investment in private assets, but many remain
capped by state law and general industry practices at 5% of fund assets. 83
The public pension fund category is somewhat concentrated, following
state population patterns, with the largest funds (and states) holding a
significant portion of the category’s assets. Smaller states and their funds
tend to follow the regulatory and investment lead of the larger states and
funds. The largest of these funds, and the largest pension fund in the

80. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 77, 90.
81. Primary Fund, one of the original and largest money market funds, “broke the buck” in

September 2008 when it revalued its portfolio to reflect losses in its Lehman Brothers holdings.
See Sam Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks the Buck, Freezes Redemptions,
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/money-market-fundbreaks-buck/story.aspx?guid={56A2CEE5-5A53-4A27-A4BA-585CFBE173A4}&dist= msr_1.
82. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 42–43.
83. See id. at 76; see also Average Asset Mixes, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 21, 2008,
available at http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/CHART/401969275/1/PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY.
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country, is the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS)
fund, with over $250 billion in assets as of 2007. 84
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules
State and local government pension funds are regulated by state law,
which varies from state to state. Traditionally, public pension funds have
operated under statutory “investment guidelines” that identify categories of
eligible investments, often with percentage caps on each. The guidelines
reflect a preference for public assets (such as federal and state obligations,
investment-grade debt, and publicly-traded stock that meets specified
earnings and dividend tests), which typically are subject to large caps or
none at all. The guidelines place restrictive caps on private assets (such as
private equity, hedge funds and private mortgages), given their greater
illiquidity and risk. 85
Over the past couple decades, the shift has been away from mandatory
investment guidelines toward delegating greater investment discretion to
state fund boards. For example, California gives its investment board
“plenary authority” under a prudent investor standard to invest funds as it
sees fit. 86 Nonetheless, even as many state statutes have come to delegate
investment and allocation discretion to state boards with respect to public
assets, many continue to impose caps on specified categories of private
assets.
Public pension funds, though not subject to the redemption obligations
of mutual funds, are generally required to invest in liquid assets so “funds
may be readily converted into cash when needed.” 87 Consistent with this
philosophy, many states place a cap on “alternative investments”—that is,
non-public assets such as private equity and hedge funds. For example,
Florida and North Carolina limit investment in private firms to 5% of fund

84. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 76. The federal government also
maintains a pension plan for employees. As of 2007, federal government pension plans held only
$1.2 trillion in assets. Approximately 12.5% of federal government employee pension fund assets
are held in corporate equities, compared to the approximately 60% held in equities by private
pension plans. See id. at 42, 43, 76, tbl. L 120.
85. For example, New York’s pension fund system is limited by statute to invest in
conventional mortgages (up to 30%), World Bank bonds (up to 5%), Canadian government bonds
(up to 5%), utility bonds (up to 30%), investment-grade federal, state and municipal bonds (no
more than 2% in any one non-federal issuer), U.S. public equity (up to 70%), bank-guaranteed
mortgages (up to 10%), bank notes (up to 5%), real estate (up to 5%), foreign public equity (up to
10%), and “prudent” alternative companies (up to 15%). See N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW
§ 177 (1999).
86. CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 17 (2008) (providing that “the retirement board of a public pension
or retirement system shall have plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of
moneys” and “members of the [board] shall discharge their duties with respect to the system with
the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing [of] a prudent
person.”).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 147-69.3(c) (2008).

268

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

assets. 88 Ohio sets a target for private investments of 5%, with permissible
ranges above and below the target. 89 Texas caps hedge fund investments at
5%. 90 New York places an overall 15% limit on all alternative investments,
subject to a prudent investor standard. 91
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice
In the past ten years, there has been a noticeable (though relatively
small) shift in pension fund assets from public to private assets. While the
proportion of U.S. public assets (equity and debt) has fallen from about
75% to 65% and that of international public assets has risen from about
15% to 20%, the proportion of private investments (such as private equity,
hedge funds, real estate and mortgages) has risen from 10% to 15%.
Overall, there has been a shift over the past decade through 2007 in the
proportion of public-private assets from 90–10 to 85–15.

88. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-44, 215-47 (2008); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14769.2(b)(9) (2008) (5% cap on investments in private equity and hedge funds, defined as limited
partner or LLC interests in firms investing in public or private equity or debt, or corporate
buyouts).
89. OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT
OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES, DEFINED BENEFIT FUND 3 (Nov. 2007), https://www.opers.org/pdf/
investments/policies/DB-Investment-Policy.pdf#zoom=100.
90. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 825.3012 (2008).
91. N.Y. RETIRE. AND SOC. SEC. LAW § 177(8) (2008). The New York State Retirement Fund
has 16.1% of its portfolio allocated to global equity. See infra Part IV, Exhibit 1.
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Table 3 92

Breaking down the categories, the biggest shifts have been in U.S.
public equity (falling from about 45% to 40%), U.S. public debt (falling
from about 30% to 25%), international equity (rising from about 13% to
20%), and private equity (rising from about 2% to 5%). 93 These changes,
however, may reflect changing values in the different asset classes, and not
necessarily a major strategic shift in portfolio allocations. For example, the
increase in the proportion of private assets in the Florida Retirement System
came mostly from reported investment returns, not a re-allocation from
public to private assets. 94
92. Data is from PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, which each January publishes data on the largest
public and private pension funds. The data for 2006–2007 is available in P&I 1,000: The Largest
Retirement
Plans,
PENSIONS
&
INVESTMENTS,
Jan.
21,
2008,
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?category=PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY&IssueD
ate=20080121. The other statistics are from the issues for Jan. 25, 1999; Jan. 22, 2001; Jan. 20,
2003; Jan. 24, 2005; and Jan. 23, 2006. A more detailed look at the asset allocation of public
pension funds is illustrative:

93. Hedge funds have also seen an increase in public pension fund investment over the last
few years, although the data is somewhat less reliable because reporting funds do not always
break out their hedge fund investments. See also Christine Williamson, Hedge Funds: Investors
Shift to Direct Strategies, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Jan. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/PRINTSUB/823452067/1/PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY.
94. The strong performance before 2008 of private assets in public pension fund portfolios
apparently came from private equity buyouts. See Arleen Jacobius, Private Equity: Investment
Surge Powered by 53% Boost in Buyouts, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Jan. 21, 2008, available
at
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/PRINTSUB/930137994/1/PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY. A look at the Florida State Board fund reveals the impact of
value changes as compared with new investment:
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The allocation policies of several of the top funds, including CalPERS,
the New York State Retirement Fund, OPERS (Ohio), the Texas Teachers
Retirement System, and NJPERS (New Jersey) also reflect this noticeable
shift from public to private assets. 95
3. Conclusion
Although the trend has been to entrust discretion to state pension boards
to choose investment assets and determine fund allocation policies, public
pension funds appear to continue to operate with an “eligible investment”
mentality—as in many states they still must. The shift away from public
assets to private assets (about 5% over the past decade through 2007)96 may
also have reached its limit.
C. PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS
Private pension funds—which hold the defined-benefit retirement assets
for private sector employees—held $5.8 trillion in assets as of 2007. 97 With
the shift by many U.S. companies from defined-benefit to definedcontribution plans, private pension funds have declined in relative size over
the past two decades. Once the largest institutional investor of U.S. public
equities, private pension plan ownership has fallen from 23% in 1985 to
13% as of 2007. 98
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules
Private pension plans are regulated by ERISA, enacted in 1974 to
protect employees from poorly-managed and inadequately-funded pension
plans. 99 In response to the failure of many funds to meet mandatory funding
levels, which has placed in jeopardy the insurance provided by the Pension

State Board of Administration of Florida, available at http://www.sbafla.com/fund_pension.aspx.
95. See infra Part IV, Exhibit 1.
96. See Table 3, supra note 92.
97. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3.
98. See Table 1, supra note 56.
99. Sarah D. Burt, Pension Protection? A Comparative Analysis of Pension Reform in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 192–93 (2008).

2009] Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets

271

Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), Congress passed the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA). 100
In a defined-benefit plan, the employer bears the investment risk and
promises the employee a defined income on retirement. 101 Under ERISA,
the plan managers must invest with the care and skill of a prudent person
acting under the same circumstances in a like position.102 The statute
imposes no specific portfolio allocation rules.
The funding burden imposed by ERISA, and further increased by the
PPA, has led many U.S. companies to abandon their defined-benefit plans.
For example, IBM announced in 2006 it would freeze its defined-benefit
plan in 2008, moving to a defined-contribution plan. 103 IBM joined other
leading companies, including Verizon (the fifth largest U.S. private
pension) and Lockheed-Martin (another top-ten plan), to announce similar
phase-outs. 104
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice
Over the past decade, private pension plans have moved some of their
public assets to private assets, mirroring the practice of public pension
plans. The following chart shows the trends in portfolio allocation by
private pension plans over the past ten years through 2007:
Table 5 105

The changes in asset allocations reflect a decline from about 70% to
60% in U.S. public assets (similar to the 10% decline for public pension
plans) and a rise from about 17% to 22% in foreign public assets (similar to
the 5% rise for public pension plans). In the same period, private
100. Id. at 207–08. Responding to the underfunding of the PBGC (currently $14 billion), the
PPA requires companies to contribute to their pension funds up to 100 percent of current
liabilities. See PBGC ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 8 (2008).
101. Burt, supra note 99, at 193–94.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008).
103. Mary Williams Walsh, IBM to Freeze Pension Plans to Trim Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/06/business/06pension.html.
104. Id.; Jerry Geisel, Phoenix Cos. Chooses to Revamp, not Phase out, DB Plan, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Feb. 19, 2007, at 25, available at http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20070219/PRINTSUB/702190705/1031/TOC.
105. See discussion, infra note 111; http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?category=
PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY&IssueDate=20080121.
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investments (such as private equity, real estate, mortgages and hedge funds)
rose moderately from about 10% to 14% (also similar to the 5% rise for
public pension plans). Overall, the shift in the public/private allocation from
1998 to 2007 for private pension plans went from 89–11 to 86–14—at most,
a mild rebalancing.
Similar patterns emerge when looking at portfolio allocations for the
top 200 corporate pension funds—for which more accurate asset
breakdowns are available. 106 For such funds, U.S. public equities declined
from about 45% to 35% over the decade, while U.S. public debt remained
stable at about 25%. 107 Foreign equity moved from about 15% to 20%, and
foreign debt from 2% to 4%. 108 Meanwhile, private equity increased from
about 4% to 5% over the period, though trailed off after 2001. 109 The most
significant change was in “other investments” (including hedge funds and
private equity not broken out separately), which moved from about 1% to
4%. 110
The story was also similar for union-sponsored pension funds. Though
holding only 2.3% of assets among the top 200 private pension plans, union
funds have maintained a strong position in public markets—and,
interestingly, increased their investment in foreign public markets. 111 For

106. The following chart shows the asset allocation of private defined-benefit plans for the top
200 funds by size. It was developed from statistics produced by PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS. See
Average Asset Mixes, supra note 83; see also discussion, infra note 111.

107. See Average Asset Mixes, supra note 83.
108. Id.
109. Larger funds tend to allocate a greater proportion to private equity—but not that much

more. A 2007 study of the twenty largest corporate pension funds found private equity investment
to be 5.9%, compared to 5.3% for the 200 largest funds. TOM IDZOREK, IBBOTSON, PRIVATE
EQUITY AND STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION 8 (Oct. 31, 2007), available at
http://corporate.morningstar.com/ib/html/pdf.htm?../documents/MethodologyDocuments/
IBBAssociates/IbbotsonPrivateEquity.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Data, like that for other pension funds, is from PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, which each
January publishes data on the largest public and private pension funds. The data for 2006–2007 is
from P&I 1,000: The Largest Retirement Plans, supra note 92. The other statistics are from the
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the top union funds, U.S. equity investment stood at 49.1% in 2007—
compared to 35.8% for all top 200 funds. 112 Union funds have cut their
bond allocations to 25.9%, while steadily increasing allocations to foreign
equity from 4.4% in 1998 to 11.9% in 2007. 113 Likewise, their position in
private equity has risen from 0.7% in 2004 to 1.8% in 2007. 114
3. Conclusion
Private pension funds, following general institutional investment trends,
have moved decidedly into foreign assets, but only slightly more into
private assets. Under a regulatory regime that demands only that fund
allocations be consistent with “prudent” institutional norms, it is not
surprising that private pension plans have mimicked the investment
strategies chosen by their public brethren. And for both, the move to private
assets has been at best modest—and may be tapering off.
That private pension plans have not moved aggressively into private
asset classes is not surprising. Private pension managers, faced with the
pressure to preserve assets and not take risks that could bankrupt the
company, are pursuing a policy of greater (though generally cautious)
diversification. The story of GM’s pension plan, which in 2006 increased its
pension surplus by $9.6 billion, is illustrative. 115 The favorable results
happened not because of additional private or foreign investments, but
rather by reducing the fund’s stock allocation from 49% to 29%, with most
of the reallocation going to bonds. 116 In short, the incentives created by the
PPA, which seek to have companies shore up their pension plans or bear the
consequences, militate against seeking out higher-risk private assets.
D. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
As of 2007, life insurance companies held about 8% of U.S. publiclytraded equities and 20% of U.S. publicly-traded debt. 117 Most of the equity
held by insurance companies is held in separate accounts, as distinguished
from the general accounts from which life insurance companies pay claims.

issues for Jan. 25, 1999; Jan. 22, 2001; Jan. 20, 2003; Jan. 24, 2005; and Jan. 23, 2006. See supra
text accompanying note 92.
112. See P&I 1,000: The Largest Retirement Plans, supra note 92.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Allan Sloan, GM’s High-Performance Pension Machine, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2007, at
D02,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/09/
AR2007040901262.html.
116. Id.
117. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 42, 43, tbl. L 213.
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1. Portfolio Allocation Rules
State insurance law specifies asset allocation guidelines for insurers’
general accounts, 118 though not for separate accounts whose portfolio
allocations are largely a matter of account-specific investment policies and
customer choice. For regulation of asset allocations in general accounts,
many states follow the guidelines contained in the model insurance law
adopted in 1996 by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC). 119 Under the Investment Company Act, which generally regulates
separate accounts, insurance companies are typically free to choose any
investment allocation so long as it is consistent with the name and
marketing of the separate account. 120
Illustrative of general account guidelines are those imposed by the
states that are home to the most insurance companies. 121 Equity investments
in general account “admitted assets” are subject to the following caps:
Texas (25%), Illinois (20%) and New York (20%). 122 In addition, many
states limit the percentage of securities in any one company that an insurer
may hold. For example, New York specifies that admitted assets invested in
the equity holdings of any one company cannot exceed 2% of that
company’s outstanding equity securities. 123
The NAIC model insurance law, which proposes two versions of
investment guidelines for insurers’ general accounts, tracks the approach of
the larger states. Under the “defined standard” version, which requires
“prudent” investment, life insurers may invest up to 20% of admitted assets
in equities or mutual funds. 124 Under the “defined limits” version, equities
cannot exceed 20%, and unlisted equities are capped at 5%. 125

118. See generally McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701 (1945) (Congress declared that
states regulate “the business of insurance”); see also NAIC, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION:
HISTORY, PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE, http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_state_reg_
brief.pdf.
119. See Bill Anderson, et al., State Legislative Update, NAIFA NEWIS 2 (Apr. 2003),
http://www.advisortoday.com/archives/2003_august/Images/State_Matrix_Extended.pdf.
120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-1 et seq. (1940).
121. The three states home to the most insurance companies are Texas (141), New York (91)
and Illinois (77). See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK 82 tbl.10.1 (2007),
http://www.acli.com/nr/rdonlyres/a85a882f-f871-431d-976e-3316884c63eb/15016/fb_07_
allchapters2_w_insert.pdf.
122. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 425.114(b)(4)(B) (2008); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/126.10(B)(1)(a)
(2008); N.Y. INS. LAW § 1405(a)(6) (2008).
123. N.Y. INS. LAW §1405 (2008).
124. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGS. AND GUIDELINES §§ 280-1, 280-13, 280-3 (2008).
125. Id.
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2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice
The percentage of U.S. public equities owned by life insurance
companies has grown slowly but steadily since 2002. 126 The increase has
coincided with the increase in separate account assets, which have grown
from 11% of total life insurance assets in 1988, 127 to 25% in 1996, to 35%
in 2006. 128
The following table, drawn from data collected by the American
Council of Life Insurers, illustrates the public/private assets breakdown
over the eleven years preceding 2007 in insurers’ general accounts and
separate accounts, and overall.
Table 6 129

The proportion of private assets (which include mortgages, real estate,
policy loans, and other assets) has actually fallen in both the general
accounts and the separate accounts. That is, life insurers over the past ten
years have placed even more of their investment assets in public assets,
whether to underwrite insurance risks (general account) or to compete with
mutual funds and other equity tools (separate account). Looking only at
invested assets, the overall public/private proportion has gone from 81–19
to 87–13, and in the general accounts from 79–21 to 82–18. 130 That is, both
overall and in the regulated general accounts, life insurers have moved
away from private assets by about 5%. 131
A more complete breakdown of insurance company portfolio
allocations reveals some growth in the allocation of general accounts to
“other assets” such as private equity and hedge funds, but an actual decline
126. See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK supra note 121, at 1, 9. This does not include cash
investments and non-invested assets, which have comprised between 3.0% and 4.6% of total life
insurance assets.
127. Stephen E. Roth, Susan S. Krawczyk & David S. Goldstein, Reorganizing Insurance
Company Separate Accounts Under Federal Securities Laws, 46 BUS. LAW 537, 539 (1991).
128. See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 9.
129. Id. at 12–13.
130. See Table 6, supra note 129.
131. See id.
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in the allocation of these alternative investments in separate accounts. 132
While “other assets” increased in the general accounts from 1.3% to 3.2%,
they fell in the separate accounts from 8.3% to 3.0%. 133 Overall, life
insurance companies appear to be investing no more in private equity as of
2006 than they did ten years ago.
3. Conclusion
Over the past ten years, life insurance companies have increased their
allocation to public equity, while reducing their position in private assets. In
fact, the overall public/private proportions over the past ten years have
increased by about 5%—bucking somewhat the slight trend of public and
private pension plans toward more private assets. With the growth in
separate accounts, which compete with registered mutual funds, insurance
companies will in all likelihood continue their strong presence in public
markets.
The tendency of the insurance industry to stay in public markets may
well reflect the cautious attitudes of the industry and its regulators. The
investment limits applicable under most state insurance laws, which are
reflected in the NAIC guidelines, carry forward the state regulatory
tradition applicable also to state pension plans of specifying categories of
“approved investments,” each subject to its own percentage cap. This form
of “pigeon hole” regulation, which has been criticized for ignoring modern
finance theory and the value of broad diversification, assumes that the
regulated entities (whether state pension plans or insurance companies)
need only match the investment performance of their counterparts, while
maintaining the safety of the assets under their control. 134
132. Portfolio allocations by life insurance companies in their general accounts and separate
accounts has been the following:

See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 12–13.
133. See supra text accompanying note 132.
134. See Lawrence J. White, The NAIC Model Investment Law: A Missed Opportunity, in THE
STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: ASSET/LIABILITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES
(E. Altman & I. Vanderhoof, eds., 1996).
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E. BANKS (FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS)
Compared to other institutions, financial institutions (commercial
banks, savings associations and investment banks) held, as of 2007, a small
percentage of public and private equities—only 1.2% of outstanding public
equities. 135 Insured banks, which are prohibited from investing in equities in
their general portfolios, invest in equities only in their fiduciary capacity.136
Investment banks, as regulated broker-dealers, face liquidity and reserve
requirements that prevent them from being heavily invested in equities.
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules
Insured banks (including national banks, state banks and state savings
associations) are restricted from purchasing stock for their own general
accounts, but may purchase stock for the accounts that they manage in
trust. 137 As a result, trust investment is the only way insured banks can hold
equities, whether public or private.
States differ as to the proper use of equities in trust investments. 138
However, two general rules exist. Under the New York Rule, trustees
cannot invest in corporate stocks or bonds absent express authority in the
trust document, state statute or court order. 139 Under the Massachusetts
Rule, trust investments are subject to a “prudent investor” standard, which
does not bar (and may sometimes require) the trustee to invest in stocks. 140
Investment banks, subject to federal securities regulation as brokerdealers, must register with the SEC and adhere to net capital rules. 141 In
1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed the Glass-Steagal separation
of commercial and investment banking and allowed for the consolidation of
commercial banks and investment banks. 142 The distinctions between
investment banks and commercial banks explain why they invest differently
in corporate equities.
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice
Commercial banks invest a small percentage of their overall assets in
corporate equities. At the close of 2007, commercial banks had less than
0.4% of their assets in corporate equities. Savings associations invested

135. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 42, 43, 90.
136. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1831a(c) (2006).
137. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 362.3 (insured state banks); 12 C.F.R. §

362.11 (insured state savings associations).
138. 76 AM. JUR. 2D TRUSTS § 460 (2008).
139. Mertz v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 247 N.Y. 137, 159 N.E. 888 (1928).
140. Chase v. Pevear, 383 Mass. 350, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (1981).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008) (net capital rules).
142. Jonathan Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J.
CORP. L. 691 (2000).
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slightly more in equities, with 1.4% of their assets in equities. Meanwhile,
corporate equities comprised 7.3% of broker-dealer assets.
Information on private equity assets held by banks and securities firms
is not available. Nonetheless, data on holdings of corporate equity indicates
increasing proportional allocations of public equity by commercial banks,
savings banks and broker-dealers. That is, all three types of financial
institutions have allocated more of their relatively small equity investments
to public equity:
Table 7 143
Portfolio Allocation by Banks (Financial Institutions)
to Corporate Equity

Because Federal Reserve data on institutional investments labels the
assets of securities firms as “miscellaneous,” it is difficult to determine
whether and how securities firms have changed their investment mix over
the past ten years.
3. Conclusion
Commercial banks and savings institutions, because of their liquidity
obligations to depositors and the U.S. tradition of limiting their investment
in equity securities, are not significant participants in equity markets. In
contrast, securities firms (investment banks) are not as heavily regulated or
subject to the same liquidity rules, and have more investing freedom.
Although it is difficult to identify whether there has been a move to
private capital by financial institutions, the effect is miniscule given the
general inability of each to invest in equities. Nor is there any reason to
believe, given the aftermath of the Panic of 2008 and the greater antipathy
to risk-taking by U.S. financial institutions, that there will be a movement
toward private equity. At least during the overhang of the subprime debt

143. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at tbl. T.109, 73 tbl. T.114, 81 tbl. T.129.
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crisis, it seems unlikely that financial institutions will be moving strongly
into another illiquid asset class.
F. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND FOREIGN INVESTORS
Foreign private investors and foreign sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)
represent the fastest-growing category of investors in the U.S. public equity
markets. As of 2007, foreign wealth owned more than 13% of U.S. public
equities, surpassing private pension funds to become the second largest
institutional investor in U.S. public equities (behind only mutual funds). 144
From 2001 to 2007, foreign wealth (government funds, institutional
investors and foreign individuals) invested in U.S. equities doubled from
$1.4 trillion to $2.8 trillion. 145
Although SWFs have received a good deal of attention, most foreign
investment in the United States has been non-governmental, accounting for
nearly three-fourths of investment flows into the United States.146
Nonetheless, as proceeds from commodity exports and balance-of-payment
surpluses continue to flow into foreign government coffers, there is a
general consensus that SWFs will play an increasingly larger role. 147 For
example, the IMF projected (before the global economic slowdown of
2008) that global SWF assets, which stood at about $2.5 trillion as of mid2008, could reach $12 trillion by 2012. 148
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules
SWFs are generally non-transparent and so too are their investment
policies. Foreign institutional investors are subject to national investment
rules on portfolio allocation, which typically require that non-national
investments be limited to publicly-traded securities—much as for U.S.
institutional investors that invest outside the United States.
Foreign companies, which have seized upon the decline in the dollar to
make business investments and acquisitions in the United States, are a
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Peter S. Goodman & Lousie Story, Overseas Investors Buying U.S. Holdings at

Record
Pace,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
20,
2008,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/business/20invest.html?ex=1358571600&en=34079637cb59
bb3a&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink; see also Brad Setser, Follow the Money,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Sept. 23, 2008, http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/category/sovereignwealth-funds/.
147. Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets; Sovereign Wealth Funds and
the World Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 119–21 (2008). Funding for SWFs comes from two
sources: (1) commodity exports, especially petroleum, either owned or taxed by the government,
and (2) balance-of-payment surpluses. The first SWF, the Kuwait Investment Board created in
1953 by Kuwait to invest surplus oil revenue, stood virtually alone for many years. But since
2005, twelve new SWFs have been created.
148. See Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 179, 189 (2008).
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significant source of capital for U.S. private companies. 149 Like U.S.
multinationals, foreign companies (in Europe and Japan, for example) do
not operate under constraints when expanding their businesses. In fact, the
significant disclosure obligations under the U.S. securities laws (such as the
5% reporting threshold and the 10% short-swing profit rules under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934) 150 encourage foreign companies to
acquire full 100% ownership rather than partial ownership.
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice
Anecdotal information about SWFs is easy to find, but reliable data is
much more difficult. Few funds disclose financial information or
investment policies. Nonetheless, the consensus estimate is that SWF assets
worldwide total about $2.5 trillion. 151
Lack of transparency makes it difficult to determine how SWFs are
invested. Norway’s Government Pension Fund (the second largest SWF)
has been held out as a model for its transparency, but few other SWFs,
especially those of the Gulf states, have followed Norway’s lead. A report
by the IMF summarizes SWF investment strategies:
SWFs are a heterogeneous group of investors that apply a wide range of
investment strategies reflecting their different objectives. When executing
their strategic asset allocation (SAA), some SWFs invest solely in
publicly-listed financial assets (e.g., bonds and equities), while others
invest across all major asset classes, including alternative investments.
Some SWFs invest relative to market indices and sometimes put additional
caps on the maximum holding of each company’s shares with a view to
ensuring diversification. Other SWFs that aim at maximizing absolute
returns over longer time horizons may shift between different asset classes
and acquire larger stakes in specific companies that they see as profitable
investments. It is unclear how active a role they have in these companies.
However, the evidence suggests that SWF are generally passive and longterm investors with no desire to impact company decisions by actively
using their voting rights. Some apply social responsibility or ethical
guidelines to rule out specific industries (e.g., tobacco, military) that may
not conform with the social and ethical objectives of their governments. 152
149. Goodman & Story, supra note 146, at A1.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2009).
151. Estimates of worldwide SWF assets range from $1.9 trillion to $3.3 trillion. See Lyons,

supra note 148, at 189 (The IMF estimates between $1.9 and $2.9 trillion); see also Fed. Reserve
Bd. of San Francisco Economic Letter, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stumbling Blocks or Stepping
Stones
to
Financial
Globalization?
(Dec.
14,
2007),
available
at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2007/el2007-38.html (estimating SWF assets
between $1.5 and $2.5 trillion); Veljko Fotak, Bernardo Bortolotti & William Megginson, The
Financial Impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in Listed Companies (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108585 (estimating value at $3.3 trillion).
152. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS – A WORK AGENDA
(2008), available at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf.
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Virtually absent from the scant information on foreign investment
practices is any indication of a shift toward private assets. For example,
estimates of portfolio holdings in SWFs of the Gulf Cooperation Council
countries as of 2007 were $300 billion in U.S. equities, $360 billion in
bonds and deposits, and $130 billion in alternatives. 153 Specifically,
allocations for the Abu Dhabi fund in U.S. dollar assets have been
estimated at 70–85% in public equity and fixed income and 15–28% in
private assets, including private equity, real estate, and alternatives. 154
3. Conclusion
Foreign investors—both private and sovereign—may be the wild card
in the public-private capital pendulum. Although private foreign institutions
(banks and mutual funds) have regulatory limits that compel investment in
public markets, SWFs face the curious problem of having capital that may
be unsuited for private companies. With the expectation that private equity
investors bring management expertise to the enterprise, SWFs have yet to
prove their suitability.
G. ENDOWMENT FUNDS
In 2005, endowment funds invested by charitable foundations and
educational institutions held $1.3 trillion in assets. 155 Endowments, which
are typically subject to little regulation beyond their institution-specific
restrictions, invest in a wide array of assets and thus offer a textbook
experiment in balancing risk and return. 156 More than any other category of
institutional investor, endowments have moved into private capital markets,
though with a continuing and steady presence in public markets. 157
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules
Endowments are unique among institutional investors because of their
unusual combination of characteristics: defined spending rules (similar to
pension funds), tax exemption (similar to public pension funds), absence of
a safety net (unlike private pension plans), and aim to preserve capital
indefinitely (unlike any other institution). Given their relatively unrestricted
ability to pursue investment strategies and allocations, endowments reveal
153. Brad Setser & Rachel Ziemba, Understanding the New Financial Superpower: The
Management of GCC Official Foreign Assets 14 (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SetserZiemba GCCfinal.pdf.
154. Id.
155. Keith Brown, Lorenzo Garlappi & Cristian Tiu, The Troves of Academe: Asset Allocation,
Risk Budgeting and the Investment Performance of University Endowment Funds, at 1, Aug. 2007,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981436.
156. Id. at 2.
157. See generally FRONTIER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INVESTING LIKE HARVARD AND YALE
ENDOWMENT FUNDS (2007), http://www.seasholes.com/files/Frontier_-_Investing_like_Harvard
_and_Yale.pdf.
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the pressures to re-allocate portfolios to private assets, in search of higher
returns. 158
University endowments (for which detailed information is available)
are typically managed with a combination of both passive and active
strategies. University boards, for example, will often set allocation targets
for outside money managers. 159 The money managers (such as the Harvard
Management Company) then invest in various asset classes according to the
allocation targets set by the university board. 160 Whether managed passively
or actively, most endowment assets are managed by outside managers, who
play an important role in asset allocation. 161
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice
The annual survey of university endowments, conducted by the
National Association of College and University Business Officers, reveals
that university endowments have moved decidedly from public to private
assets. 162 Allocation of private assets—which includes real estate, hedge
funds, venture capital, private equity and natural resources—has increased
from 3.3% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2007, with the ratio of public/private
investments changing from 96–4 to 79–21 over the same period:

158.
159.
160.
161.

Brown, Garlappi & Tiu, supra note 155, at 1–2.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 5.
Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar & Jialan Wang, Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of
University Endowment Success 4 (MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4698-08, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027450.
162. Brown, Garlappi & Tiu, supra note 155, at 39.
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Table 8 163
Endowment Funds (by allocation of investment funds)

The move to private assets from 1990 to 2007 has come at the expense
of cash positions, which fell in the period from 10.3% to 3.5%, and
publicly-traded fixed income investments, which fell from 35.6% to
18.6%. 164 Of the private assets, hedge fund investments have had the largest
growth, increasing from 0.3% to 10.6% of endowment assets. 165 Private
equity increased more modestly from 0.2% to 2.3% of university
endowment assets. 166
Endowment size has affected portfolio allocation, with larger university
endowments allocating their portfolios to a wider array of asset classes and
thus earning significantly higher returns. 167 Investments in hedge funds and
private equity, which now constitute 12.9% of endowment assets, have been
163. Id. A more complete breakdown including the specific classes of private assets, shows the
rise of investments in hedge funds and private equity:

1990

Endowment Funds
1995
2000

2005

2007

Public equity

49.8%

54.8%

62.3%

58.4%

57.6%

Fixed income

35.6%

30.0%

23.4%

21.4%

18.6%

Real estate

2.9%

2.1%

1.9%

3.2%

3.5%

Cash

10.3%

6.5%

4.0%

3.4%

3.5%

Hedge funds

0.3%

1.6%

0.7%

8.9%

10.6%

Venture capital

0.6%

0.7%

2.4%

0.8%

0.9%

Private equity

0.2%

0.2%

1.0%

1.6%

2.3%

Natural resources

0.2%

0.3%

0.3%

1.0%

1.6%

Other

0.0%

3.9%

4.0%

1.4%

1.4%

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lerner, Schoar & Wang, supra note 161. For example, Yale University’s endowment has
come to hold less of its portfolio in public equities (28% percent in 2007), while increasing its
allocation to private equity. YALE UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS OFFICE, THE YALE ENDOWMENT
11 (2007), available at http://www.yale.edu/investments/Yale_Endowment_07.pdf. Wake Forest’s
endowment, much smaller than that of Yale’s (though often regarded as a model for smaller
endowments), held 38% of its portfolio in public equities, reflecting the phenomenon that
investment in public equities is inversely proportional to endowment size. WAKE FOREST
UNIVERSITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2006–7,
at
22
T.6
(2007),
available
at
http://www.wfu.edu/fas/reports/06-07finreport.pdf. See also Rebecca Buckman, Venture Firms vs.
Investors: Yale and the Like Quietly Cite Pressure to Back Offbeat Funds, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28,
2007, at C1.
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concentrated in larger endowments, which have the connections, the asset
base and the investment time horizon to make large, longer-term
commitments. 168 Larger endowment funds, in main part because of their
higher returns, have grown dramatically over the last fifteen years. 169 This
has been widely attributed to the use of private assets by endowments,
which, as 2008 has shown, may not have been worth the risk.
Despite the move to private assets, university endowments remain
firmly rooted in public equity, which actually increased proportionally in
their portfolios from 49.8% in 1990 to 57.6% in 2007—reflecting in part
the strong equity returns of the 1990s. 170 Public equity, following the trend
of other institutional investors, has become more international. U.S. public
equity investments have declined since 1990, while foreign public equity
investments have increased significantly—from 2.3% in 1990 to 12.7% in
2005. 171
3. Conclusion
University endowment funds, unfettered by portfolio allocation
standards and more inclined to seek to balance risk and return in a
diversified portfolio, have moved more aggressively toward private assets
than any of the U.S. institutional investors. Nonetheless, the move has not
come at the expense of public equity, as the usual “going private” story
tells, but rather at the expense of cash positions and public debt. Moreover,
there are indications that the strong move to private assets may have
reached a natural limit. 172
Overall, investment by endowments reflects a propensity to stay in the
public markets, even as some endowments have increased their allocation to
private markets. Small endowments need public markets because they are
not ready to be players in private equity and hedge funds. And the larger
endowments, after moving aggressively into private assets, seem to be
tapering off—the more recent increases in private assets a result of their
stronger returns and not increased allocation. The current decline in the
returns on hedge fund investments portends an allocation to private assets
of no more than 20% going forward—hardly an abandonment of public
assets.
168. See Lerner, Schoar & Wang, supra note 161, at 4.
169. Id. at 3. For example, in 2005, the endowments of the Ivy Plus schools (Ivy League, Duke,

Stanford, CalTech, and MIT) earned 14%, as compared to 9% for other schools.
170. See National Association of College and University Business Officers, Average Asset
Class Allocation of Total Assets (2008), available at http://www.nacubo.org/documents/
research/Average%20Asset%20Allocation%20of%20Total%20Assets_2007%20NES.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Harvard, after losing 22% in the first four months of fiscal 2008, estimated total losses for
the year at 30% reflecting revaluation of real estate holdings and private assets. John Hechinger
and Craig Karmin, Harvard Hit by Loss as Crisis Spreads to Colleges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008,
at A1.

2009] Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets

285

IV. CONCLUSION: STAYING PUBLIC
Institutional investors, far from being a free radical capable of
rebalancing their portfolios at will, are legally and culturally captives of
public markets. There is little reason to believe this will change, unless
public assets somehow are shown to be clearly inferior (over a significant
time period) compared to private assets. At most, private capital markets
have over the past several years been exploring their boundaries—as they
do with some regularity. There is little reason to think they will swallow or
even come close to challenging the dominance of public markets.
Certainly, the evidence of the past ten years indicates there has been no
institutional tidal shift toward private assets. While some institutional
investors have allocated more of their portfolios to private assets (public
pension funds, endowments, and perhaps foreign institutions), others have
allocated less of their portfolios (private pension funds, insurance
companies, and perhaps financial institutions). And the largest institutional
category (mutual funds) has not wavered in its nearly complete allocation to
public assets.
On one hand, it might be argued that the failure of institutional
investors to move more strongly into private assets is simply (and
regrettably) a matter of regulatory constraint. Arguments have been made
that some institutional investors, such as insurance companies, are stodgy
captives of a “permitted investments” mentality that deprives their
beneficiaries of the safer, stronger returns that diversification through
private assets brings to an investment portfolio. But even as SWFs and
endowments, unconstrained by regulation and adherents to modern
portfolio theory, have moved into private assets, their move has been tepid.
Public assets, particularly public equity, appear to remain the bulwark in
their diversified portfolios.
Moreover, even if the regulatory constraints on institutional asset
allocation were broadly lifted, it is unclear whether the supply side of the
capital markets would rush toward private assets. Already many
institutional investors have the regulatory freedom to move toward private
assets, but have not. Mutual funds, perhaps because of liquidity concerns
and perhaps because of customer demand, have remained bound to public
assets, despite SEC policy that permits them to invest significantly more in
private assets. And other institutional investors that are subject to
“permitted investment” regulation have not tested the allocation caps for
private assets.
In the end, given the current shakeout in the credit markets—which has
dramatically exposed the risks of investing in non-transparent private
assets—it is unclear that private markets offer significantly different riskreturn opportunities compared to those available in public markets. In fact,
many companies that have “gone private” by moving from public equity to
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private equity have remained in the public debt markets because of
institutional investor demand.
Institutional investors (the supply side of the U.S. capital markets) have
exhibited a strong preference for investments in public companies—and the
market and regulatory protections such investments imply. From
appearances, public markets are here to stay.
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Exhibit 1
Asset Allocations of Notable Public Pension Funds
CalPERS 173

Domestic Equity
Domestic Fixed Income
International Equity
International Fixed Income
Cash
Alternative Investment/Private Equity
Real Estate

40.0%
22.3%
19.5%
2.3%
1.4%
6.7%
8.0%

New York State Retirement 174
Domestic Equity (Publicly Traded)
Private Equity
Absolute Return
Real Estate
Global Equity
Bonds, Cash, Mortgages
Inflation Indexed Bonds

42.2%
6.5%
3.0%
4.4%
16.1%
20.9%
6.9%

Ohio Public Employee Retirement System 175
Domestic Equity
Real Estate
Private Equity
International Equity
U.S. Fixed Income
International Fixed Income
Cash Equivalents

43.8%
4.7%
1.7%
20.3%
25.7%
2.0%
1.8%

173. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT:
YEAR
ENDED
JUNE
30,
2007
(2007),
at
16,
available
at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/investmentreport-2007/.
174. N.Y. STATE AND LOCAL RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT: FOR FISCAL
YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 2007 (2007), at 62, available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/retire/
word_and_pdf_documents/publications/cafr/cafr_07.pdf.
175. OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEES RET. SYS., THE COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT: FOR THE
YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2006 AND 2005 (2007), at 68, available at
https://www.opers.org/pubs-archive/investments/cafr/2007-cafr-hires.pdf#zoom=80.

288

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
North Carolina Retirement System 176

[Vol. 3

Fixed Income
Domestic Equity
International Equity
Real Estate
Alternatives

35.5%
40.0%
17.0%
4.5%
2.9%

New York City Employee Retirement System 177
Domestic Equity
Domestic Fixed Income
International Equity
Alternative Investments

46.8%
30.3%
18.6%
4.3%

New Jersey PERS 178

Domestic Equities
Domestic Fixed Income
International Equities
International Fixed Income
Commodity Linked Notes
Police and Fireman's Mortgages
Private Equity
Real Estate
Absolute Return Strategy Funds

176. N.C. DEP’T

41.7%
26.1%
22.8%
1.3%
0.7%
1.6%
1.5%
1.3%
3.1%

OF THE STATE TREASURER, THE STATE TREASURER’S ANNUAL REPORT TO
PEOPLE OF N.C. (2007), at 27, available at http://www.nctreasurer.com/NR/rdonlyres/
BCF46334-5821-4819-B2AF9DC2E29FB3EF/0/NCREPORTweb.pdf.
177. N.Y. CITY EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS. & N.Y. CITY PUB. EMPLOYEES’ GROUP LIFE INS.
PLAN, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT (2007), at 99, available at
http://www.nycers.org/Pdf/cafr/2007/NYCERS_Final.pdf.
178. STATE OF N.J., PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS.: FIN. STATEMENTS AND SCHEDULES (2007),
at 15, available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/2007_cafr_audit_report.pdf.
THE

